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ABSTRACT 
Context-aware systems adapt their behaviour based on the 
context a user is in. Since context is potentially privacy 
sensitive information, users should be empowered to 
control how much of their context they are willing to share, 
under what conditions and for what purpose. We propose an 
interactive consent mechanism that allows this. It is 
interactive in the sense that users are asked for consent 
when a request for their context information is received. 
Our interactive consent mechanism complements a more 
traditional pre-configuration approach. We describe the 
architecture, the implementation of our interactive consent 
mechanism and a use case.  
Author Keywords 
Context, privacy, interactive consent, context-aware 
applications 
ACM Classification Keywords 
H5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): 
Miscellaneous.  
INTRODUCTION 
Context information, or context for short, describes the 
situation a user is in. Examples are where someone is and 
what he is doing, e.g., whether someone is working or not. 
Context-awareness is an essential characteristic of the 
pervasive, ubiquitous computing environment that Mark 
Weiser envisioned [20] and that is gradually becoming a 
reality due to improved sensor technologies, improved 
mobile network coverage, smaller computing devices, etc. 
Context is sensed by physical sensors (e.g., a GPS receiver, 
that provides location information) or by a logical sensors 
(e.g., a software component that reads someone calendar), 
and can be combined and reasoned with to produce higher-
level context (e.g., is someone available to receive a phone 
call?). Context information is potentially privacy sensitive 
information, and even apart from legal obligations, for users 
to accept context-aware applications they need to feel in 
control over this privacy [8].  
The existing practice for applications to obtain consent to 
gather and use personal information is to let the user accept 
a legal statement that is incomprehensible for the average 
user, also known as click-through agreement. The user only 
has the choice to consent to this agreement or to not use the 
services at all (takes all / leave all). We believe that this is 
approach is not suitable to be applied in ubiquitous 
computing environments, and does not provide actual 
privacy control for the user. With the introduction and 
uptake of context-aware applications the amount of 
personal information that is collected is increasing, as well 
as the number of applications that make use of this 
information.  To be able to protect ones privacy people 
need to know what context is collected about them and how 
it is used, and they need to have means to control this. 
Therefore, users should be provided with an actual and 
personalized privacy control, in which they can control 
what context to share in a fine-grained manner. This will 
increase user acceptance, and provide a value-add over take 
all/ leave all type of consent.  
In cases where a more fine-grained privacy control is 
offered, this is usually based on pre-configuration: users 
have to configure in advance which people or applications 
can have access to particular information. A major issue 
when providing users with a fine-grained control over their 
privacy is that this quickly will become too complicated for 
most users to understand within the amount of time they are 
willing to spent to configure their privacy policies. In 
addition, due to the dynamicity of the pervasive 
environments that context-aware systems will execute in, 
users do not know which service they will use, and in what 
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 context they will use them in. They can therefore not be 
expected to configure their privacy preferences in advance.  
This paper proposes to use an interactive consent approach 
in which users are asked for their consent at the point in 
time some application or other user requests their context. 
They can then, at that point in time and thus given the 
context they are in, determine if they want to share this 
context with the requester. The obvious risk is that the users 
will find the consent questions too interruptive. We 
therefore made it possible for users to generalize their 
responses to also apply to a range of future consent 
requests, allowing the privacy enforcement system to 
incrementally learn their privacy policies. The interactive 
consent approach we propose in this paper is 
complementary to more traditional pre-configuration 
approaches. 
Besides the interactive consent mechanism itself, a second 
contribution of the paper is a proof-of-concept prototype of 
this mechanism using mobile phones. This prototype is 
implemented as part of a context infrastructure for context-
aware mobile applications. We describe a use case where 
we used this interactive consent prototype for a context-
aware meeting scheduling application. 
This paper is structured as follows. We first describe related 
work. Then, we analyze the issues with providing informed 
user consent, and propose our interactive consent 
mechanism. Next, we describe the architecture of our proof-
of-concept, followed by a use-case for our proof-of-concept 
prototype. We end this paper with conclusions and discuss 
possibilities for future work. 
RELATED WORK 
The need for more insight and control on sharing of 
personal information, such as context information, in 
ubiquitous computing like environments, is confirmed by 
Petterson et. al [17]. This paper maps legal privacy 
principles to human-computer interface (HCI) 
requirements. It proposes user interfaces for the user to 
simplify the process of obtaining consent and for the 
application to follow legal privacy principles and adhere to 
privacy legislation.  
The work of Petterson et al. is based on the research 
conducted by the PISA project. The PISA project 
investigated user agreements for obtaining informed user 
consent. Patrick et al. describe their work in the PISA 
project [15]. They acknowledge that the legal statements 
provided by applications are often long, complex and 
difficult for users to read and/or understand. They therefore 
introduce the concept of Just-In-Time-Click-Through 
Agreements (JITCTA). The main feature of JITCTA is not 
to provide a large, complete list of service terms but instead 
to confirm understanding or consent on an as-needed basis. 
While the work described by Petterson et al. and Patrick et 
al. focuses on how to convey legal privacy statement 
following privacy principles, our work focuses at how 
personal information can best be protected in a context-
aware environment. Patrick et al. assume that consent only 
needs to be requested when users are using applications 
themselves and that they are providing the personal 
information themselves, while in context-aware 
environments context information is constantly being 
collected. This requires another way to protect this 
information. 
One commonly applied way for users to indicate to what 
extend they want to expose their personal information is by 
pre-configuring their privacy preferences or policies. 
However, there are a number of drawbacks with this 
approach, especially in context-aware and ubiquitous 
computing environments. Lederer et al. state that users do 
not like to spend much time on specifying their privacy 
settings [10]. When they start using an application they are 
willing to configure their settings – although it should not 
be too cumbersome - but they do not like to do this on a 
regular basis. People therefore easily forget what they have 
configured, resulting in outdated privacy policies with 
possibly unwanted consequences.  
A study by Beckwidth [2] shows that people not only forget 
what they have configured but also the fact that they are 
being monitored. People should be reminded to make sure 
that they stay aware that information on them is collected 
and about the consequences.  
Cornwell et al. describe that people are unable to achieve 
high levels of accuracy when specifying their privacy 
preferences. Rules they had specified at the beginning of 
the experiment only captured their preferences 59% of the 
time. After revision, this number only went up to 65%. [3]. 
A possible reason for this is brought up by Nodder [12] 
who found that people cannot image the situations well 
enough when configuring their privacy policies, resulting in 
inconsistent observed behaviour. Another explanation is 
provided by Palen and Dourish, who state that privacy is an 
ongoing ‘boundary definition process’ [13]. Also Patil et al. 
[14] state that circumstances may change such that 
permissions defined yesterday are no longer applicable 
today. They are therefore in favour of increased system 
transparency to build trust. They argue that real-time 
feedback with a visual component may have a more 
significant impact on the awareness of people. Appropriate 
feedback mechanisms and interfaces need to be explored to 
further help users visualize their permission settings. 
There are several papers that describe guidelines on privacy 
for context-aware systems. These guidelines provide 
requirements for our interactive consent solutions, but also 
illustrate the shortcomings of other solutions existing today. 
Lederer et al. describe a number of pitfalls when designing 
interactive systems with personal privacy implications 
based on the results of a user study [10]. The ground for 
these pitfalls is that people should be able to understand 
what information is disclosed about them and the 
implications to one’s privacy, and they should be able to 
configure their privacy settings using methods in a natural 
extension of the current design of these systems and the 
way people are used to handle them. 
A paper by Langheinrich et al. [9] describes a number of 
guidelines based on a set of fair information practices as 
common in most privacy legislation in use today. These 
include amongst others: 
• Notice – people should be notified when personal 
information on them is collected, stored and further 
processed or exchanged,  
• Choice and consent – people need to have the choice 
whether to allow this and provide their explicit consent, 
and  
• Access and recourse – people should have access to 
what information is collected on them and what has 
been done with this data and have means to change or 
remove this personal information. 
In a short paper Grudin et al. [6] provides an overview of 
different approaches for access control to context 
information, amongst which the interactive access control. 
The approach they describe resembles the interactive 
consent mechanisms we propose. However the paper does 
not provide much detail, and especially no design or 
prototype details on how to realize interactive access 
control.  
Related work by our own group [11] describes a small user 
study to understand how users deal with privacy-sensitive 
information and if informed consent can be improved by an 
interactive approach. The (preliminary) conclusion is that 
users consider interactive consent supplemental to a pre-
configuration approach, not replacing this. Another 
conclusion was that users want their privacy policies to be 
people or group based, contrary to context or activity based. 
INTERACTIVE CONSENT 
Inherent choice between privacy and context 
There are Privacy Enhancing Technologies, especially in 
the area of anonymisation (e.g., [5]) that can and should be 
used to make context-aware applications less privacy 
sensitive. However, for many applications users Privacy 
Enhanding Technologies cannot prevent that a choice needs 
to be made between a user’s privacy or making an 
application context-aware. Categories of applications for 
which this applies are applications in which users are 
simply not anonymous, and social networking type of 
applications. A concrete example is a mobile health 
application for tele-monitoring of patient with epileptic 
seizures. If there is a seizure, the location of the patient 
needs to be shared with available and nearby caregivers. 
This application is useless without sharing the context 
(location, availability) in a non-anonymized manner.  
Personalized privacy by empowering users  
From literature we known that the willingness of people to 
give up some of their privacy depends on (i) how much 
someone trusts the receiver of the privacy sensitive 
information, (ii) the usefulness of the application and (iii) 
the privacy sensitivity of the information [1]. These three 
factors are very personal – what is useful to one person is 
not useful for another etc. Privacy policies should therefore 
be personalized. This means each user need to be 
empowered to control the privacy vs. context trade-off. 
When possible this should not be a take-all/leave-all policy, 
but a more fine-grained policy in which users can give 
consent to share part of their context information.  
Personalized privacy is context-aware 
The willingness of users to share context information is not 
only personal, but also depends on the context of the user. 
In fact, both the sensitivity of the context information as 
well as the usefulness of the context-aware application 
depends on the user context. For example, in case of an 
application in which context is shared between colleagues 
to facilitate contact, users may only willing to share their 
context (location, activity) with colleagues when their own 
context is “working” since otherwise (i) their location may 
reveal a private activity they do not want to share (privacy 
sensitivity of the information), and (ii) since they do not 
want to be contacted anyway by their colleagues when not 
working (thus no usefulness). 
Privacy management trade-off triangle 
We distinguish three contradicting requirements in the 
development of our privacy management solution for 
supporting informed consent (Figure 1). 
 
understandable
fine-grained
control
non-intrusive
 
Figure 1 - The privacy management trade-off triangle 
The solution should be understandable; users must 
understand what they give consent to, or put differently, the 
consent should be an informed consent. Users must be able 
to review their privacy policies, the access log of their 
personal information (respectively called potential and 
actual information flow in [10]) and be able to change their 
privacy policies. The solution should provide fine-grained 
control; users must be able to specify in detail under which 
conditions what context information may be released to 
 3
 who. Finally, the solution should be non-intrusive; users 
should not perceive it as annoying or interruptive by 
bothering the user too often, especially not if this is with 
repetitive consent questions or is done at inconvenient 
times. The challenge is that privacy management solutions 
cannot satisfy all three requirements since they are 
contradicting and therefore has to make a trade-off between 
these requirements. For example, fine-grained control adds 
complexity and thus reduces understandability, whereas 
asking for consent to share some context every time the 
system wishes to do so may be understandable and provide 
fine-grained control, but is too intrusive. 
Our approach: interactive consent 
Summarizing the above, a solution is needed that provides 
users way to personalize their privacy consent for sharing 
context information, that solution needs to be context-aware 
itself, and should be a good compromise between 
understandability, fine-grained control and intrusiveness. 
The approach we propose in this paper is interactive 
consent, in which a user is asked for consent at the moment 
a request for context information is received.  This means 
that users do not have to pre-configure their consent, which 
as we discussed in related work is a pitfall [10]. Pre-
configuration is especially difficult due to the dynamicity of 
ubiquitous computing environments in which users will not 
know before hand which application they will use, and 
sometimes not even while using a context-aware 
application. 
We discuss to what extend this approach addresses the three 
above contradicting requirements: 
• Understandability: since a user is aware of the context 
he or she is in when the consent request is received, the 
user understands the privacy sensitivity of revealing 
this context, and can compare this with the usefulness 
of the application at that moment. 
• Fine-grained control: the user can provide consent per 
context request, which is as fine-grained as possible. 
• Non-intrusive: actually asking for consent every time 
some context request is received will very quickly be 
considered too intrusive for most if not all users. This 
is a major challenge for the interactive consent to be 
successful. To address this, we make it possible for 
users to give their consent for equal or similar context 
requests that may happen in the future. The simplest 
case is the “allow always” and “deny allows” options, 
but we also offer more sophisticated possibilities in 
which the user can provide what we call 
generalizations of the consent. Examples are “allow for 
all colleagues”, or even “allow for all colleagues while 
I’m working”. This allows the privacy enforcement 
system to gradually learn the user’s privacy 
preferences.  This is further discussed in the 
Architecture & Design section. 
Interactive consent vs pre-configuration 
Interactive consent supplements a more traditional pre-
configuration approach [11]. This is because of the 
potential intrusiveness, because it is not suitable for all 
types of applications (e.g., emergency applications) and 
because users will need to be able to inspect and change 
consent (potential information) that he or she provided that 
is valid beyond the immediate consent request.  
Applications for which interactive consent is suitable will 
typically have one or more of the below characteristics: 
• Complex service – for which users have complex 
privacy preferences, including services for which the 
user would want privacy policies that context-aware, 
and services that deal with social relationships (since 
social relationships are complex). 
• Service that will be forgotten or of which users are not 
aware – for these types of service there is an increased 
risk that users do not or no longer realize that they gave 
consent, including service were other people can view 
a user’s context, but not vice-versa (e.g., an employer 
that can check the context of employees), long-term 
services that are only used infrequently, or hidden 
services (the true ubiquitous or  'pervasive' type). 
• Highly dynamic services – so the user could not pre-
provision the privacy policy since she would not know 
this service or situation would occur beforehand. This 
includes cases where the receiver of the context 
changes (e.g., community type of services in which 
people can join the community without consent of the 
user),  or where the privacy sensitivity of the context 
depends on the context (e.g., some user may want to 
share his location, but not when visiting a certain 
place), or a service that is used only one-time. 
ARCHITECTURE & DESIGN 
We implement our interactive consent mechanism as part of 
a context infrastructure. A context infrastructure is a 
middleware layer that facilitates development of context-
aware applications by offering context management, 
context reasoning, privacy and other generic functionalities 
[18]. 
context-aware applications
context infrastructure
network and system resources
 
Figure 2 - Architecture of context infrastructure 
Figure 2 provides a high-level layered view of such a 
context infrastructure. The context infrastructure collects 
context information from multiple context sources, and 
provides context-aware applications access to this 
information through request-response and subscribe-notify 
mechanisms. This context data can be raw or reasoned (i.e. 
aggregated or derived information). The context 
infrastructure provides access control based on personalized 
privacy policies.  
The context infrastructure contains both a policy decision 
point as well as policy enforcement points for processing 
the privacy policies of the users.  
context-aware
application
context
mngt service
interactive
consent
server
interactive
consent
client
context
source
 
Figure 3 - interactive consent positioned in context 
architecture 
Figure 3 positions interactive consent in the context 
infrastructure. The policy decision point functionality is 
taken care of by the interactive consent server. When a 
request for context information comes in and the existing 
privacy policies don’t provide a definite answer on whether 
or not to provide access, the user is asked for consent via 
the interactive consent client.  
Context-Aware
Application
Context
Server
Interactive
Consent
Server
Interactive
Consent
Client
Context
Source
Alice Bob
1. 10.
9. 2.
3.
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7. 4.
6. 5.
 
Figure 4 - interactive consent message flow 
Figure 4 illustrates all the steps that are taken in this 
process. User Alice uses a context-aware application (1) 
that requests context information of user Bob (2). The 
policy for accessing this information has been configured to 
be interactive. In this case the Context Management Service 
(the policy enforcement point) asks the Interactive Consent 
Server (the policy decision point) (3) that sends a request 
for interactive consent to Bob using the Interactive Consent 
Client running on one of Bobs devices (4,5). Bob can 
inspect the request and based on the information provided 
with the request can make a decision whether to approve, 
deny or ignore the request (6). The consent is passed on by 
the Interactive Consent Client and Server to the Context 
Management Service (7,8) that grants (in case of approve) 
or denies (in case of deny or ignore) access to the requested 
context information (9,10).  
Main architectural choices 
Above we described the main architectural components and 
a typically flow of interactions between them. Below we 
detail this by discussing how we addressed the main 
architectural challenges. 
Interact with users via their smart phone 
The interactive consent server needs to interact with user 
when his or her consent is required. This is done via the 
interactive consent client application. Since most people 
carry a mobile phone with them nowadays, we chose to 
implement the interactive consent client on a smart phone. 
Standard interaction mechanisms on mobile phone 
(typically SMS) are not sophisticated enough to implement 
interactive consent with, we there implemented a dedicated 
interactive consent client application. This client 
application registers with the interactive consent server and 
listens for incoming consent requests. When a request for 
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 consent comes in, the client application shows a notification 
to the user (see Figure 5). The user can respond to the 
consent request, which will either grant or deny the 
requestor access to the information he asked for. The user 
can also simply ignore the consent request, in which the 
request will time out and access to the context information 
will of course be denied. 
 
Figure 5 - request for consent 
Some people argue that notifications should not be used and 
will be ignored by the user [16]. Other studies show that 
notifications are considered helpful by the user [7]. We 
follow the second strain of thought, arguing that whenever 
the user is presented with useful information and this does 
not happen too often (i.e., does not disturb the user), 
notifications are a good way to attract the attention of  a 
user. 
Simple questions with option for more details 
As argued before, we want to offer fine-grained control but 
at the same time make it understandable. And we have to 
cater for people that want less or more fine-grained control. 
We chose to address this by offering a simple choice to the 
user, but with an option to get more details and possibilities 
for more fine-grained control if desired. The simple choice 
shows who is requesting the context, and what context 
information. This allows the user to decide whether he or 
she want to share the context based on the trust in the 
requester as well as on the privacy sensitivity of the 
information (i.e., the context requested and its value at that 
point in time), which as e.g., [12] has shown are important 
factors. 
Figure 5 already showed how the user initially is only 
presented with a simple question: “<requester> wants to 
know your <context information>, where <requester> is the 
name of the requester and <context information> can be 
any kind of context delivered by the context server, such as 
location or availability. Figure 6 gives an example of how 
user is presented with more details on the request if the user 
selects “More options”. Details include with what 
application the requesting user is accessing the context, 
whether it is a one-time request-response or a subscription, 
how the requesting user was authenticated and what context 
information would be shared. This includes the quality of 
the context, since higher quality information typically is 
more privacy sensitive [19]. An obvious example of this is 
location: which building someone is in is more privacy 
sensitive than which city. 
  
Figure 6 - additional details 
Generalization of the answer 
To prevent that user are flooded with requests for consent 
each time someone enquires their context information, we 
have implemented a mechanism for minimizing the number 
of consent requests by generalizing the consent responses.  
 
Figure 7 - generalization of consent responses 
Instead of allowing or disallowing one person access to one 
particular piece of context information, the user can also 
choose to allow or disallow (see Figure 7): 
• more people to have access to this information 
• the information to be shared multiple times 
• access to more information than requested 
• access to this information through other 
applications. 
This can greatly reduce the number of consent requests. 
The issue remains what generalizations to propose to the 
user. As the study from Patil et al. shows [14], default 
settings are okay in 80% of the cases. There is no reason to 
assume that this would not apply for the generalizations 
people want. We therefore expect that in most cases users 
will accept a default generalization that is proposed by the 
consent server. 
Polite blocking 
Since denying access to context may be considered ‘rude’, 
we adapt the ‘polite blocking’ concept. This means that a 
requester of context will simply be told the context is not 
available, independent of whether this is the case because 
there is indeed no context source that can provide this 
information, or if the context owner has not given their 
consent. In case of subscription based interactions between 
application and context infrastructure, the context requester 
will simply never get an update of the context. 
Expiry of the privacy policies 
Several studies have indicated that it is not only hard for 
users to pre-configure privacy policies correctly (e.g. [4]), 
but the validity of privacy policies also decreases over time. 
Palen et. al [13] write that “privacy management is not 
about setting rules and enforcing them; rather, it is the 
continual management of boundaries between different 
spheres of action and degrees of disclosure within those 
spheres” [5]. In other words, the relationships with other 
people and the extend to which people would like to share 
personal information in particular situations changes over 
time. We therefore introduced an expiry time for each 
provided privacy policy, which the user can specify with 
each consent response that is valid for more than once. 
When a privacy policy has expired the user is automatically 
triggered again when the associated context information is 
requested again. 
Request-respond vs subscribe-notify 
When an application requests context information from the 
context infrastructure it can do this via a request-response 
or via a subscribe-notify interface. In the latter case, the 
application will be provided with notifications when the 
context changes (or in a fixed interval).  For request-
response the user is straightforward when to ask for 
consent: when the request is received. For subscribe-notify 
however there are several possibilities: when the 
subscription is received or for each individual notification. 
Since there is no obvious best choice, we decided to design 
the interactive consent to do both. When a subscribe 
message is received, we send a consent request to the user 
to which the user can decide to either grant one time access 
or to allow the application to get notifications when the 
context information has changed, in addition to the 
generalization as described above. By providing an expiry 
time, the user is able to allow the application to be notified 
of context changes only for a limited time period. The user 
can also indicate the maximum rate at which applications 
will be notified about context changes. 
To be able to notify the applications on context changes, the 
context management service needs to be notified by the 
context sources itself. It therefore needs to register with or 
actively poll the context sources. Privacy policies ensure 
that privacy sensitive information is not disclosed,  
effectively discarding information produced by the context 
sources and wasting communication and processing 
resources. The collection of context information by the 
context management service from the context sources needs 
to be carefully thought through to find an optimal solution. 
A trade off needs to be made between the flexibility of 
privacy policies and the impact this has on the collection of 
the required context information. Interactive consent does 
not provide more flexible privacy policies but enables more 
dynamic privacy policy management, which also adds to 
this complexity. 
USE-CASE 
To validate the concept of interactive consent, and to 
determine its limitations, we have used it in a context-aware 
application called C-Meeting. C-Meeting stands for 
Context-aware Meeting, and makes regular Outlook™ 
meetings context aware by informing the meeting 
participants if the other participants are already at the 
meeting location, and if not, if they are travelling towards 
the meeting location and will arrive on time. Figure 8 gives 
an overview of the C-Meeting application architecture, and 
a typical flow of interactions between the main 
components. 
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Figure 8 - C-Meeting architecture 
A meeting organizer can schedule a C-Meeting by 
scheduling a regular Outlook™ appointment with the 
category ‘C-Meeting’. When the meeting request is sent (1) 
to a meeting participant a url is added to the request 
providing access to additional (context) information related 
to this meeting. Also a privacy statement is included that 
informs the participants that this is a context-aware 
meeting.  The C-Meeting application server is notified of 
each participant that accepted the C-Meeting invite (2 & 3). 
Shortly before the meeting (15 minutes) any participant can 
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 view the likelihood of the other participants are at the 
meeting location (4). The C-Meeting application server asks 
the context management service for the relevant context 
information (5). Before sharing this information with the C-
Meeting application service the context management 
services checks with the interactive consent server if the 
user has consented to this (6). The interactive consent 
server sends a consent request to the interactive consent 
client if the user has no stored privacy policy to cover this 
context request (7). 
 
Figure 9 - C-Meeting user interface (anonymized) 
Figure 9 shows the user interface of the C-Meeting 
application. For each of the participant (that have accepted 
the meeting request), the likelihood of that participant to be 
at the meeting location on time is indicated using ‘traffic 
light’ icons. By clicking on the small map icon on the right, 
participants can get a map showing the current location of 
the other participants. 
The ‘traffic light’ icon is based on a prediction based on 
travel patterns (GSM cell ids), and has certain probability 
associated with it. Details on how this reasoning 
functionality works are out of scope for this paper. The 
probability is reflected in the text next to the icon. Based on 
the probability the likeliness of someone coming to the 
meeting location can be probably, maybe or probably not.  
In this use-case, we can distinguish two different types of 
consent that we need: 
1. When the meeting invite is received, and users have to 
consent if other participants can view their likelihood 
to be on the meeting location in time (including 
estimated-time-of-arrival) 
2. When another meeting participant wants to view their 
actual location (only possible shortly before and during 
the meeting).  
For the first type we found that our Interactive Consent 
mechanism was not the best solution. If one of the 
participants would open the C-Meeting user interface this 
would trigger consent request to all participants, which 
would be too intrusive. In addition, we expect that users 
will not consider the context information that is shared very 
privacy sensitive (i.e., if you are already at the meeting 
location, and if not, if you are travelling towards the 
meeting location and your estimated time of arrival). We 
therefore choose to make the consent here part of each 
meeting invite instead: this explicitly states the privacy 
consequences, and by accepting the meeting invite the user 
consents to this. 
For the second type we did use our Interactive Consent 
mechanism. This is because the current location will be 
considered privacy sensitive information for most people. 
When one of the participants thus clicks on the map icon of 
another participant, this participant receives a interactive 
consent request (see previous section for screendump 
examples). 
The C-Meeting application has been used over a period of 6 
months by a small user group. A problem with the user 
experience of the interactive consent was that even if the 
user who’s consent was requested would allow this, it takes 
too long from the perspective of the requesting user. 
Consistent with our polite blocking choice, the requesting 
user also does not know how to wait, since if we do not 
show a map this could be because the requesting user did 
not give their consent yet, or disallow access or because the 
location is unknown.  
EVALUATION & CONCLUSION 
Users should be offered personalized way to privacy control 
who can access their context, at what quality, and under 
what conditions. Interactive consent complements pre-
configuration approaches to empower the user to have such 
control. Our interactive consent mechanism obtains explicit, 
informed consent from the user at the moment that context 
is requested. Benefits of this over pre-configuration 
approaches are improved understandability and fine-grained 
control because (i) the user is better aware which (context) 
information he or she consent to sharing, (ii) the user can 
better determine of usefulness of the application outweighs 
the lost of privacy given the context at that point of time 
and (iii) the consent can be provided at a per-context-
request granularity.  
The major disadvantage of our approach is the potentially 
unacceptable intrusiveness due the interruptions caused by 
the consent requests. To prevent this, we: 
• Allow consent replies to be valid for longer periods, 
i.e., also for future context requests, thereby building 
up the privacy policies to enforce. 
• Allow consent replies to be generalized, e.g., to apply 
to all colleagues and not only to the colleague who 
request some context. 
Additional disadvantages are that the context requester may 
have to wait considerable time for the consent, making 
interactive consent less suitable for applications in which 
the context requester is a human that is waiting for an 
answer, or context applications that need a near immediate 
response such as emergency applications. In addition, as 
was the case of part of the consent needed in our use-case, 
there are application in which another form of consent is 
more natural for the user because it fits better in the normal 
interaction flow with the application. 
Besides more elaborate user trials, future work will focus 
on reducing the intrusiveness further. A specific idea we 
have is to learn and propose generalized policies based on 
past consent replies, e.g., if a user always accept location 
requests from colleagues while working, to propose this as 
a policy. This may give better results than only proposing 
the same (default) generalizations to all users. A second 
improvement to reduce intrusiveness is to delay the consent 
request (when possible) to a time that a user considers it 
less intrusive, e.g., not during but right after a meeting.  
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